SOVEREIGN CLEAN SKYBB2G · Verification Lab
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Working software prototype · Synthetic data only

Identity is one proof.
Permission is another.

Run real cryptographic checks against simulated aircraft, operators and missions. Every contact stays visible. No action here controls an aircraft, firearm or government system.

01 · IdentityProve possession
02 · PermissionCheck the mission
03 · IntegrityPreserve the evidence

Preparing local verification…

01 · Aircraft, operator and mission

Test the gaps.

No live aircraft

Public evidence and trust boundary

Signing keys never leave this session. The issuer public-key fingerprint below pins this session’s demonstration root. An exported package cannot establish its own trust: an independent verifier must obtain its trusted issuer and expected challenge separately. Government samples contain pseudonyms, not sensitive identity or location.

02 · Separate firearm research track

Verify a report. Preserve uncertainty.

Simulated sensor reports

These buttons create signed sample reports. They do not detect damage or locate a firearm. Existing serial numbers remain required where applicable; supplementary identity is a research addition.

A sensor report never confirms theft. Theft reports need authenticated reporting and accountable review; location recovery additionally needs valid authority, hardware and connectivity. No location is collected by this lab.

03 · Integrity oversight

Two approvals. One accountable change.

Synthetic reviewers

Require two independent reviewers. The requester cannot approve their own change, including through a second identity using the same key. Approval roles and keys are session demonstrations, not real identities or access permissions.

Signed audit evidence

Each action adds a hash-linked record. A signed checkpoint detects altered, reordered or truncated history against the pinned session issuer. Protection from issuer compromise needs an independently retained checkpoint and real governance.

Retain this audit issuer fingerprint separately from your evidence download:

    What is built, and what remains.

    Readiness boundaries
    Built and testable hereRequires further integration
    P-256 signatures, key-possession challenges, independent trust pinning, separate authorization checksManufacturer enrollment, hardware key protection, Remote ID protocol integration and independent cryptographic review
    Revocation/freshness rejection, namespace isolation and protected mission visibilityFleet revocation distribution, offline flight safety, agency identity resolution and mesh hardware
    Signed sample sensor-report checks, two-signature change approvals and audit integrityPhysical firearm marking, sensor coverage, stolen-property reporting agreements and authorized recovery hardware

    Latest hardening and payment clarification · Full requirements and acceptance matrix · Prototype operation and verification limits